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Abstract
Being able to release and exploit open data gathered in information sys-
tems is crucial for researchers, enterprises and the overall society. Yet, these
data must be anonymized before release to protect the privacy of the sub-
jects to whom the records relate. Differential privacy is a privacy model
for anonymization that offers more robust privacy guarantees than previ-
ous models, such as k-anonymity and its extensions. However, it is often
disregarded that the utility of differentially private outputs is quite limited,
either because of the amount of noise that needs to be added to obtain them
or because utility is only preserved for a restricted type and/or a limited
number of queries. On the contrary, k-anonymity-like data releases make no
assumptions on the uses of the protected data and, thus, do not restrict the
number and type of doable analyses. Recently, some authors have proposed
mechanisms to offer general-purpose differentially private data releases. This
paper extends such works with a specific focus on the preservation of the
utility of the protected data. Our proposal builds on microaggregation-based
anonymization, which is more flexible and utility-preserving than alternative
anonymization methods used in the literature, in order to reduce the amount
of noise needed to satisfy differential privacy. In this way, we improve the
utility of differentially private data releases. Moreover, the noise reduction
we achieve does not depend on the size of the data set, but just on the
number of attributes to be protected, which is a more desirable behavior for
large data sets. The utility benefits brought by our proposal are empirically
evaluated and compared with related works for several data sets and metrics.
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1. Introduction
Releasing and exploiting open data is crucial to boost progress of knowl-
edge, economy and society. Indeed, the availability of such data facilitates
research and allows better marketing, better planning and better social ser-
vices. However, data publication often faces privacy threats due to the
confidentiality of the information that is released for secondary use. To
tackle this problem, a plethora of methods aimed at data anonymization
have been proposed within the field of statistical disclosure control [1]. Such
methods distort input data in different ways (e.g. noise addition, removal,
sampling, data generalization, etc.) so that the probability of re-identifying
individuals and, thus, disclosing their confidential information is brought
below a tolerable threshold. Even though those methods have been shown
to improve privacy protection while preserving a reasonable level of analyt-
ical utility (the main motivation of data publishing), they offer no formal
privacy guarantees.
In contrast, privacy models proposed in recent years within the com-
puter science community [2, 3] seek to attain a predefined notion of privacy,
thus offering a priori privacy guarantees. These guarantees are interesting
because they ensure a minimum level of privacy regardless of the type of
transformation performed on input data. Among such models, k-anonymity
and the more recent ε-differential privacy have received a lot of attention.
k-Anonymity [4, 5] seeks to make each record in the input data set in-
distinguishable from, at least, k − 1 other records, so that the probability
of re-identification of individuals is, at most, 1/k. Different anonymization
methods have been proposed to achieve that goal, such as removal of outly-
ing records, generalization of values to a common abstraction [5, 6, 7, 8] or
multivariate microaggregation [9, 10]. The latter method partitions a data
set into groups at least k similar records and replaces the records in each
group by a prototypical record (e.g. the centroid record, that is, the average
record). Whatever the computational procedure, k-anonymity focuses on
masking quasi-identifier attributes; these are attributes (e.g., Age, Gender,
Zipcode and Race) that are assumed to enable re-identifying the respondent
of a record because they are linkable to analogous attributes available in
external identified data sources (like electoral rolls, phone books, etc.). k-
Anonymity does not mask confidential attributes (e.g., salary, health condi-
tion, political preferences, etc.) unless they are also quasi-identifiers. While
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k-anonymity has been shown to provide reasonably useful anonymized re-
sults, especially for small k, it is also vulnerable to attacks based on the
possible lack of diversity of the non-anonymized confidential attributes or
on additional background knowledge available to the attacker [11, 12, 13, 14].
Unlike k-anonymity, the more recent ε-differential privacy [15] model
does not make any assumptions on which attributes are quasi-identifiers,
that is, on the background knowledge available to potential attackers seeking
to re-identify the respondent of a record. ε-Differential privacy guarantees
that the anonymized output is insensitive (up to a factor dependent on ε)
to the modification, deletion or addition of any single input record in the
original data set. In this way, the privacy of any individual is not compro-
mised by the publication of the anonymized output, which is a much more
robust guarantee than the one offered by k-anonymity. Differential privacy
is attained by adding an amount of noise to the original outputs that is
proportional to the sensitivity of such outputs to modifications of particular
individual records in the original data set. This sensitivity does not depend
on the specific values of attributes in specific records, but on the domains
of those attributes. Basing the sensitivity and hence the added noise on at-
tribute domains rather than attribute values satisfies the privacy guarantee
but may yield severely distorted anonymized outputs, whose utility is very
limited. Because of this, ε-differential privacy was originally proposed for
the interactive scenario, in which the outputs are the answers to interactive
queries rather than the data set itself. When applying ε-differential privacy
to this scenario, the anonymizer returns noise-added answers to interactive
queries. In this way, the accuracy/utility of the response to a query depends
on the sensitivity of the query, which is usually less than the sensitivity
of the data set attributes. However, the interactive setting of ε-differential
privacy limits the number and type of queries that can be performed. The
proposed extensions of ε-differential privacy to the non-interactive setting
(generation of entire anonymized data sets) overcome the limitation on the
number of queries, but not on the type of queries for which some utility is
guaranteed (see Section 2.2 below).
1.1. Contribution and plan of this paper
In previous works [16, 17], we showed that the noise required to fulfill
differential privacy in the non-interactive setting can be reduced by using
a special type of microaggregation-based k-anonymity on the input data
set. The rationale is that the microaggregation performed to achieve k-
anonymity helps reducing the sensitivity of the input versus modifications
of individual records. As a result, data utility preservation can be improved
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(in terms of less data distortion) without renouncing the strong privacy
guarantee of differential privacy. With such a mechanism, the sensitivity
reduction depends on the number of k-anonymized groups to be released;
in turn, this number is a function of the value of k and the cardinality
of the data set. The larger the group size k, the less sensitive are the
group centroids resulting from the microaggregation; on the other hand, the
smaller the data set, the smaller the number of different group centroids
in the microaggregated data set. Thus, as the group size increases or the
data set size decreases, the sensitivity decreases and less noise needs to be
added to reach differential privacy. Hence, the resulting differentially private
data have higher utility. In the two abovementioned works, we empirically
showed that the noise reduction more than compensates the information loss
introduced by microaggregation.
In line with [16, 17], in this paper we investigate other transformations
of the original data aimed at reducing their sensitivity. The proposal in
this paper is based on individual ranking microaggregation, a kind of mi-
croaggregation that is more flexible and utility-preserving than the one used
in [16, 17]. In contrast to the previous works, the reduction of sensitivity
achieved by the method presented in this paper does not depend on the size
of the data set, but just on the number of attributes to be protected. This
is more desirable for large data sets or in scenarios in which only the confi-
dential attributes should be protected. In fact, experiments carried on two
reference data sets show a significant improvement of data utility (in terms
of relative error and preservation of attribute distributions) with respect to
the previous work. Moreover, the microaggregation mechanism used in this
paper is simpler and more scalable, which facilitates implementation and
practical deployment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews back-
ground on microaggregation, ε-differential privacy and ε-differentially pri-
vate data publishing. Section 3 proposes the new method to generate ε-
differentially private data sets that uses a special type of microaggregation
to reduce the amount of required noise. Implementation details are given
for data sets with numerical and categorical attributes. Section 4 reports an
empirical comparison of the proposed method and previous proposals, based
on two reference data sets. The final section gathers some conclusions.
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2. Background and related work
2.1. Background on microaggregation
Microaggregation [9, 18] is a family of anonymization algorithms that
works in two stages:
• First, the data set is clustered in such a way that: i) each cluster
contains at least k elements; ii) elements within a cluster are as similar
as possible.
• Second, each element within each cluster is replaced by a representa-
tive of the cluster, typically the centroid value/tuple.
Depending on whether they deal with one or several attributes at a time,
microaggregation methods can be classified into univariate and multivariate:
• Univariate methods deal with multi-attribute data sets by microaggre-
gating one attribute at a time. Input records are sorted by the first
attribute, then groups of successive k values of the first attribute are
created and all values within that group are replaced by the group
representative (e.g. centroid). The same procedure is repeated for
the rest of attributes. Notice that all attribute values of each record
are moved together when sorting records by a particular attribute;
hence, the relation between the attribute values within each record
is preserved. This approach is known as individual ranking [18, 19]
and, since it microaggregates one attribute at a time, its output is
not k-anonymous at the record level. Individual ranking just reduces
the variability of attributes, thereby providing some anonymization.
In [20] it was shown that individual ranking causes low information
loss and, thus, its output better preserves analytical utility. However,
the disclosure risk in the anonymized output remains unacceptably
high [21].
• To deal with several attributes at a time, the trivial option is to map
multi-attribute data sets to univariate data by projecting the former
onto a single axis (e.g. using the sum of z-scores or the first principal
component, see [19]) and then use univariate microaggregation on the
univariate data. Another option avoiding the information loss due to
single-axis projection is to use multivariate microaggregation able to
deal with unprojected multi-attribute data [9, 22]. If we define optimal
microaggregation as finding a partition in groups of size at least k
such that within-groups homogeneity is maximum, it turns out that,
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while optimal univariate microaggregation can be solved in polynomial
time [23], unfortunately optimal multivariate microaggregation is NP-
hard [24]. This justifies the use of heuristic methods for multivariate
microaggregation, such as the MDAV algorithm [10], which has been
extensively used to enforce k-anonymity at the record level [10, 25, 26].
In any case, multivariate microaggregation leads to higher information
loss than individual ranking [20].
2.2. Background on differential privacy
Differential privacy was originally proposed by [15] as a privacy model
in the interactive setting, that is, to protect the outcomes of queries to a
database. The assumption is that an anonymization mechanism sits between
the user submitting queries and the database answering them.
Definition 1 (ε-Differential privacy). A randomized function κ gives ε-
differential privacy if, for all data sets X1, X2 such that one can be obtained
from the other by modifying a single record, and all S ⊂ Range(κ), it holds
Pr(κ(X1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε)× Pr(κ(X2) ∈ S). (1)
The computational mechanism to attain ε-differential privacy is often
called ε-differentially private sanitizer. A usual sanitization approach is
noise addition: first, the real value f(X) of the response to a certain user
query f is computed, and then a random noise, say Y (X), is added to mask
f(X), that is, a randomized response κ(X) = f(X) + Y (X) is returned. To
generate Y (X), a common choice is to use a Laplace distribution with zero
mean and ∆(f)/ε scale parameter, where:
• ε is the differential privacy parameter;
• ∆(f) is the L1-sensitivity of f , that is, the maximum variation of the
query function between neighbor data sets, i.e., sets differing in at
most one record.
Specifically, the density function of the Laplace noise is
p(x) =
ε
2∆(f)
e−|x|ε/∆(f).
Notice that, for fixed ε, the higher the sensitivity ∆(f) of the query function
f , the more Laplace noise is added: indeed, satisfying the ε-differential
privacy definition (Definition 1) requires more noise when the query function
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f can vary strongly between neighbor data sets. Also, for fixed ∆(f), the
smaller ε, the more Laplace noise is added: when ε is very small, Definition 1
almost requires that the probabilities on both sides of Equation (1) be equal,
which requires the randomized function κ(·) = f(·) + Y (·) to yield very
similar results for all pairs of neighbor data sets; adding a lot of noise is a
way to achieve this.
Differential privacy was also proposed for the non-interactive setting
in [27, 28, 29, 30]. Even though a non-interactive data release can be used to
answer an arbitrarily large number of queries, in all these proposals, this is
obtained at the cost of offering utility guarantees only for a restricted class
of queries [27], typically count queries.
2.3. Related work on differentially private data publishing
In contrast to the general-purpose data publication offered by k-anonymity,
which makes no assumptions on the uses of published data and does not
limit the type and number of analyses that can be performed, ε-differential
privacy severely limits data uses. Indeed, in the interactive scenario, ε-
differential privacy allows only a limited and pre-selected number of queries
of a certain type to be answered; in the extensions to the non-interactive
scenario, any number of queries can be answered, but utility guarantees are
only offered for a restricted class of queries. We next review the literature
on non-interactive ε-differential privacy, which is the focus of this paper.
The usual approach to releasing differentially private data sets is based
on histogram queries [31, 32], that is, on approximating the data distribu-
tion by partitioning the data domain and counting the number of records in
each partition set. To prevent the counts from leaking too much informa-
tion they are computed in a differentially private manner. Apart from the
counts, partitioning can also reveal information. One way to prevent par-
titioning from leaking information consists in using a predefined partition
that is independent of the actual data under consideration (e.g. by using a
grid [33]).
The accuracy of the approximation obtained via histogram queries de-
pends on the size of the histogram bins (the greater they are, the more
imprecise is the attribute value) as well as on the number of records con-
tained in them (the more records, the less relative error). For data sets
with sparsely populated regions, using a predefined partition may be prob-
lematic. Several strategies have been proposed to improve the accuracy
of differentially private count (histogram) queries, which we next review.
In [34] consistency constraints between a set of queries are exploited to in-
crease accuracy. In [35] a wavelet transform is performed on the data and
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noise is added in the frequency domain. In [32, 36] the histogram bins are
adjusted to the actual data. In [37], the authors consider differential privacy
of attributes whose domain is ordered and has moderate to large cardinality
(e.g. numerical attributes); the attribute domain is represented as a tree,
which is decomposed in order to increase the accuracy of answers to count
queries (multi-dimensional range queries). In [38], the authors generalize
similar records by using coarser categories for the classification attributes;
this results in higher counts of records in the histogram bins, which are much
larger than the noise that needs to be added to reach differential privacy.
For data sets with a significant number of attributes, attaining differential
privacy while at the same time preserving the accuracy of the attribute
values (by keeping the histogram bins small enough) becomes a complex
task. Observe that, given a number of bins per attribute, the total num-
ber of bins grows exponentially with the number of attributes. Thus, in
order to avoid obtaining too many sparsely populated bins, the number of
bins per attribute must be significantly reduced (with the subsequent ac-
curacy loss). An interesting approach to deal with multidimensional data
is proposed in [39, 40]. The goal of these papers is to compute differen-
tially private histograms independently for each attribute (or jointly for a
small number of attributes) and then try to generate a joint histogram for
all attributes from the partial histograms. This was done for a data set of
commuting patterns in [39] and for an arbitrary data set in [40]. In par-
ticular, [40] first tried to build a dependency hierarchy between attributes.
Intuitively, when two attributes are independent, their joint histogram can
be reconstructed from the histograms of each of the attributes; thus, the
dependency hierarchy helps determining which marginal or low-dimension
histograms are more interesting to approximate the joint histogram. The
approaches in [39, 40] can be seen as complementary to our proposal, which
can be used as an alternative for computing the histograms. This does not
mean that our proposal is not competitive against [39, 40] in terms of data
utility. The data utility depends highly on the actual data that we have.
The most favorable cases for [40] are data sets with low dependency between
attributes (for instance, when attributes are completely independent, com-
puting the marginal histograms is enough) or at least with attributes that
depend on a small number of other attributes (for example, for an attribute
that depends only on another attribute, the joint histogram for these two
attributes is enough). On the contrary, if an attribute has a sizeable and
similar level of dependency on all the other attributes, there is no advantage
in using [40].
Our work differs from all previous ones in that it is not limited to his-
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togram queries and it allows dealing with any type of attributes (ordered or
unordered).
2.4. Related work on microaggregation-based differentially-private data pub-
lishing
In [17] we presented an approach that combines k-anonymity and ε-
differential privacy in order to reap the best of both models: namely, the
reasonably low information loss incurred by k-anonymity and its lack of as-
sumptions on data uses, as well as the robust privacy guarantees offered by
ε-differential privacy. In that work, we first defined the notion of insensitive
microaggregation, which is a multivariate microaggregation procedure that
partitions data in groups of k records with a criterion that is relatively in-
sensitive to changes in the data set. To do so, insensitive microaggregation
defines a total order for the joint domains of all the attributes of the input
data set X. Insensitive microaggregation ensures that, for every pair of data
sets X and X ′ differing in a single record, the resulting clusters will differ at
most in a single record. Hence, the centroids used to replace records of each
cluster will have low sensitivity to changes of one input record. Specifically,
when centroids are computed as the arithmetic average of the elements of
the cluster, the sensitivity is as low as ∆(X)/k, where ∆(X) is the dis-
tance between the most distant records of the joint domains of the input
data and k is the size of the clusters. This sensitivity is much lower and
restrained than the one offered by standard microaggregation algorithms,
such as MDAV [10], whose output is highly dependent on the input data
(i.e. modification of a single record may lead to completely different clus-
ters). Note also that the sensitivity of individual input records (i.e. without
microaggregation) is ∆(X). The downside of insensitive microaggregation
is that it yields worse within-cluster homogeneity than standard microag-
gregation and, hence, higher information loss.
As a result of insensitive microaggregation with cluster cardinality k,
input data are k-anonymized in such a way that all attributes are consid-
ered as being quasi-identifiers. To obtain a differentially private output, an
amount of noise needs to be added to cluster centroids that depends on their
sensitivity. Centroids provided by insensitive microaggregation have a low
sensitivity and thus require little noise, which in turn means incurring low
information loss. In data publishing, n/k centroids are released, each one
computed on a cluster of cardinality k and having sensitivity ∆(X)/k (see
discussion above). Hence, the sensitivity of the whole data set to be released
is n/k × ∆(X)/k. Thus, for numerical data sets, Laplace noise with scale
9
parameter (n/k × ∆(X)/k)/ε must be added to each centroid to obtain a
ε-differentially private output.
For the above procedure to effectively reduce the noise added to the
output with respect to standard differential privacy via noise addition with
no prior microaggregation, the sensitivity n/k×∆(X)/k needs to be smaller
than the sensitivity of the data set without prior microaggregation, that
is, ∆(X). To that end, the k-anonymity parameter should be adjusted.
Increasing k has two effects: it reduces the contribution of each record to the
cluster centroid (thereby reducing the centroid sensitivity), and it reduces
the number of clusters (thereby reducing the number of published centroids).
Specifically, for n/k × ∆(X)/k to be less than ∆(X), a value k > √n is
needed. This shows that the utility benefits of this method depend on the
size n of the data set.
Here one must acknowledge that, while prior microaggregation enables
noise reduction as discussed above, microaggregating records into centroids
also entails some utility loss. However, this loss is more than compensated
by the benefits brought by cluster centroids being less sensitive than individ-
ual records. This is so because microaggregation can exploit the underlying
structure of data and reduce the sensitivity with relatively little utility loss.
This hypothesis is empirically supported by the extensive evaluations per-
formed in [17, 16].
Even though this previous work effectively reduces the amount of Laplace
noise to be added to reach ε-differential privacy, the fact that it requires
using a microaggregation parameter k that depends on the number of records
n of the input data set may be problematic for large data sets. In other
words, for large data sets, a value of k so large may be required that the
utility loss incurred in the prior microaggregation step cancels the utility
gain due to subsequent noise reduction.
To circumvent this problem, in this paper we present an alternative pro-
cedure that offers utility gains with respect to standard differential privacy
regardless of the number of records of the input data set. Specifically, our
method rests on individual ranking univariate (rather than insensitive mul-
tivariate) microaggregation to reduce sensitivity in a way that only depends
on the number of attributes to be protected. 1 This behavior is more de-
1Microaggregation is used to improve the utility of the released data, while pri-
vacy guarantees are provided by differential privacy alone. However, it is interesting
to note that, while the multivariate microaggregation in [16, 17] yielded an intermediate
k-anonymous data set, the individual ranking microaggregation in this paper yields an
intermediate probabilistically k-anonymous [41] data set.
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sirable in at least the following cases: i) data sets with a large number of
records; ii) data sets with a small number of attributes; iii) data sets in which
only the confidential attributes, which usually represent a small fraction of
the total attributes, should be protected.
3. Differential privacy via individual ranking microaggregation
In this section we present a method to obtain differentially private data
releases which, for specific data sets, may reduce noise even more than the
above-mentioned approach based on multivariate microaggregation. First,
we discuss in detail the limitations of that previous mechanism. Then, we
present a new proposal that, based on individual ranking, reduces the sensi-
tivity of the microaggregated output independently of the number of records.
For simplicity, we first assume data sets with numerical attributes to which
an amount of Laplace noise is added to satisfy differential privacy. At the
end of this section, we detail how the proposed method can be adapted to
deal also with categorical attributes.
3.1. Limitations of multivariate microaggregation for differentially private
data releases
In [16, 17], the utility gain was limited by the insensitive multivariate
microaggregation. Such microaggregation anonymizes the input data set at
the record level.
The sensitivity of the set of n/k centroids thus obtained is n/k×∆(X)/k
because, in the worst case:
• Changing a single record in the input data set can cause all n/k clusters
to change by one record
• The record changed within each cluster can alter the value of the clus-
ter centroid by up to ∆(X)/k, where ∆(X) is the maximum distance
between elements in the domain of the input data (we are assuming
that centroids are computed as the arithmetic average of record values
in the cluster).
The above worst-case scenario overestimates the actual sensitivity of
the output and, thus, the noise to be added to the centroids to achieve ε-
differential privacy. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that modifying one input
record by up to ∆(X) would change by ∆(X) one record in each cluster.
Let us consider an extreme scenario, in which all records in the input data
set take the maximum possible value tuple in the domain of X. Recall that
11
the insensitive microaggregation used sorts and groups records according to
a total order defined over the domain of X. Then, assume that the record
located in the last position of the sorted list changes to take the minimum
value tuple of the domain of X, so that its distance to any of the other
records in the data set is ∆(X). According to the ordering criterion, such a
change would cause the modified record to be “inserted” in the first position
of the sorted list. Consequently, all other records would be moved to the
next position, which would change all clusters by one record. However, from
the perspective of the centroid computation (i.e the average of the record
in the group), only the first cluster centroid, where the modified record is
located, would change and its variation would be exactly ∆(X)/k.
In other intermediate scenarios, the effect of modifying one record would
be split among the centroids of the clusters affected by the modification.
Intuitively, the aggregation of the centroid variations would seem to be
upper-bounded by ∆(X)/k, which corresponds to the extreme case de-
tailed above. However, this is only true if a total order for the domain
of X exists for which the triangular inequality is satisfied, that is, when
d(r1, r2) + d(r2, r3) ≥ d(r1, r3) holds for any records r1, r2 and r3 in X.
Unfortunately, this is generally not the case for multivariate data because
a natural total order does not always exist. Artificial total orders defined
for multivariate data (for example, see the proposal in [17]) do not fulfill
the triangular inequality and, as discussed above, the sensitivity of indi-
vidual centroids should be multiplied by the number of released centroids
(n/k ×∆(X)/k) to satisfy differential privacy.
The lack of a total order does not occur in univariate numerical data sets,
that is, those with just one attribute. With a single numerical attribute, a
natural total order (the usual numerical order) can be easily defined with
respect to the minimum or maximum value of the domain of values of the
attribute so that the triangular inequality is fulfilled. In these conditions,
it is shown in [9] that clusters in the optimal microaggregation partition
contain consecutive values. The next lemma shows that the sensitivity of
the set of centroids is indeed ∆(X)/k.
Lemma 1. Let x1, · · · , xn be a totally ordered set of values that has been
microaggregated into bn/kc clusters of k consecutive values each, except per-
haps one cluster that contains up to 2k − 1 consecutive values. Let the
centroids of these clusters be x¯1, · · · , x¯bn/kc, respectively. Now if, for any
single i, xi is replaced by x
′
i such that |x′i − xi| ≤ ∆ and new clusters and
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centroids x¯′1, · · · , x¯′bn/kc are computed, it holds that
bn/kc∑
j=1
|x¯′j − x¯j | ≤ ∆/k.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that x′i > xi (the proof for
x′i < xi is symmetric). Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that n is a multiple
of k (we will later relax this assumption). Hence, exactly n/k clusters are
obtained, with cluster j containing consecutive values from x(j−1)k+1 to xjk.
Let ji be the cluster to which xi belongs. We can distinguish two cases,
namely x′i ≤ xjik+1 and x′i > xjik+1.
Case 1. When x′i ≤ xjik+1, x′i stays in ji. Thus, the centroids of all
clusters other than ji stay unchanged and the centroid of cluster ji increases
by ∆/k, because x′i = xi + ∆. So the lemma follows in this case.
Case 2. When x′i > xjik+1, two or more clusters change as a result of
replacing xi by x
′
i: cluster ji loses xi and another cluster j
′
i (for j
′
i > ji)
acquires x′i. To maintain its cardinality k, after losing xi, cluster ji acquires
xjik+1. In turn, cluster ji+1 loses xjik+1 and acquires x(ji+1)k+1, and so on,
until cluster j′i, which transfers its smallest value x(j′i−1)k+1 to cluster j
′
i− 1
and acquires x′i. From cluster j
′
i + 1 upwards, nothing changes. Hence the
overall impact on centroids is
n/k∑
j=1
|x¯′j − x¯j | =
j′i∑
j=ji
|x¯′j − x¯j |
=
xjik+1 − xi
k
+
x(ji+1)k+1 − xjik+1
k
+ · · ·+ x
′
i − x(j′i−1)k+1
k
=
x′i − xi
k
=
∆
k
. (2)
Hence, the lemma follows also in this case.
Now consider the general situation in which n is not a multiple of k. In
this situation there are bn/kc clusters and one of them contains between k+1
and 2k−1 values. If we are in Case 1 above and this larger cluster is cluster
ji, the centroid of ji changes by less than ∆/k, so the lemma also holds;
of course if the larger cluster is one of the other clusters, it is unaffected
and the lemma also holds. If we are in Case 2 above and the larger cluster
is one the clusters that change, one of the fractions in the third term of
Expression (2) above has denominator greater than k and hence the overall
sum is less than ∆/k, so the lemma also holds; if the larger cluster is one of
the unaffected ones, the lemma also holds. 
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3.2. Sensitivity reduction in multivariate data sets via individual ranking
microaggregation
From the previous section, it turns out that, for univariate data sets, the
amount of noise needed to fulfill differential privacy after the microaggrega-
tion step is significantly lower than with the method in [17] (i.e. ∆(X)/k
vs. n/k × ∆(X)/k). Moreover, this noise is exactly 1/k-th of the noise
required by the standard differential privacy approach, in which the sensi-
tivity is ∆(X) because any output record may change by ∆(X) following a
modification of any record in the input (as also stated in [42] when sorting
attributes by their value counts).
To benefit from such a noise reduction in the case of multivariate data
sets, we rely on the following composition property of differential privacy.
Lemma 2 (Sequential composition [43]). Let each sanitizing algorithm
Agi in a set of sanitizers provide εi-differential privacy. Then a sequence of
sanitizers Agi applied to a data set D provides (
∑
i εi)-differential privacy.
In the context of differentially private data publishing, we can think of a
data release as the collected answers to successive queries for each record in
the data set. Let Ir(X) be the query that returns the value of record r (from
a total of n records) in the data set X. In turn, we can think of Ir(X) as the
collected answers to successive queries for each of the attributes of record
r. Let Ira(X) be the query function that returns the value of attribute a
(from a total of m attributes). We have Ir(X) = (Ir1(X), . . . , Irm(X)). The
differentially private data set that we seek can be generated by giving a
differentially private answer to the set of queries Ira(X) for all r = 1, . . . , n
and all a = 1, . . . ,m. Differential privacy being designed to protect the
privacy of individuals, such queries are very sensitive and require a large
amount of noise.
To reduce sensitivity and hence the amount of noise needed to attain
differential privacy, we rely on individual ranking microaggregation (which
is more utility-preserving than multivariate microaggregation, as explained
in Section 2.1 above). Instead of asking for Ira(X), the data set is generated
by asking for individual ranking microaggregation centroids. Let ρX(r, a) be
the group of records of data setX in the individual ranking microaggregation
of attribute a that corresponds to r, and let CρX(r,a) be associated centroid.
We replace Ira(X) by CρX(r,a).
Now, we have to minimize the amount of noise required to answer these
queries in a differentially private manner. We work with each attribute inde-
pendently and then combine the queries corresponding to different attributes
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by applying sequential composition. If we get an ε-differentially private re-
sponse to (CρX(1,a), . . . , CρX(n,a)) for each a = 1, . . . ,m, then joining them
we have mε-differential privacy.
For attribute a, we have to answer the query (CρX(1,a), . . . , CρX(n,a)) in
an ε-differentially private manner. If we compute the L1-sensitivity of this
query, sa, we can attain ε-differential privacy by adding a Laplace distributed
noise with scale parameter sa/ε to each component CρX(i,a). We have already
seen that for individual ranking microaggregation the L1-sensitivity of the
list of centroids is ∆a/k. However, in our query each centroid appears k
(or more times); hence, the sensitivity is multiplied by k and becomes ∆a
(or greater), which is not satisfactory. Our goal is to show that we can
attain ε-differential privacy by adding a Laplace noise with scale ∆a/(kε)
rather than ∆a/ε (as an L1-sensitivity of ∆a would require). To that end,
instead of taking an independent draw of the noise distribution for each of
the components, we use the same draw for all the components that refer to
the same centroid. That is, we use the same random variable LρX(r,a) to
determine the amount of noise that is added to all the components sharing
the same value CρX(r,a); similarly, in data set X
′ we use LρX′ (r,a) as noise for
all components sharing the same value CρX′ (r,a). For ε-differential privacy,
it must be
Pr((CρX(1,a) + LρX(1,a), . . . , CρX(n,a) + LρX(n,a)) = (x1, . . . , xn))
Pr((CρX′ (1,a) + LρX′ (1,a), . . . , CρX′ (n,a) + LρX′ (n,a)) = (x1, . . . , xn))
≤ exp(ε).
If any of x1, . . . , xn is not a centroid value plus the noise correspond-
ing to that centroid value (note that equal centroid values are added equal
noise values, as said above), the probabilities in both the numerator and
the denominator of the above expression are zero, and differential privacy
is satisfied. Otherwise, we have that x1, . . . , xn are only repetitions of n/k
different values, that is, the values of the n/k centroids plus the noise cor-
responding to each centroid value. Thus, we can simplify the expression by
removing all but one of each of those repetitions. Let Ci,a(X) and Ci,a(X
′)
for i = 1, . . . , n/k be the centroid values for attribute a associated to X
and X ′, respectively, and Li,a and L′i,a be Laplace noises with scale ∆a/(kε)
associated to those centroid values, respectively. After rewriting the above
inequality in these terms and taking into account that the sensitivity of the
list of centroids is ∆a/k, it is evident that ε-differential privacy is satisfied.
Pr((C1,a(X) + L1,a, . . . , Cn/k,a(X) + Ln/k,a) = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n/k))
Pr((C1,a(X ′) + L′1,a, . . . , Cn/k,a(X ′) + L′n/k,a) = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n/k))
≤ exp(ε).
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Hence, we propose the following algorithm to obtain a differentially pri-
vate versionXD of a numerical original data setX with attributesA1, · · · , Am.
Algorithm 1.
1. Use individual-ranking microaggregation independently on each attribute
Ai, for i = 1 to m. Within each cluster, all attribute values are replaced
by the cluster centroid value, so each microaggregated cluster consists
of k repeated centroid values. Let the resulting microaggregated data
set be XM .
2. Add Laplace noise independently to each attribute AMi of X
M , where
the scale parameter for attribute AMi is
∆(AMi )/ε = ∆(Ai)/(k × ε).
The same noise perturbation is used on all repeated centroid values
within each cluster.
Now we can state:
Lemma 3. The data set output by Algorithm 1 is mε-differentially private.
Proof. The lemma follows from the discussion preceding Algorithm 1.

Note. In Step 2 of Algorithm 1, it is critically important to add exactly
the same noise perturbation to all repeated values within a microaggregated
cluster. If we used different random perturbations for each repeated value,
the resulting noise-added cluster would be equivalent to the answers to k in-
dependent queries. This would multiply by k the sensitivity of the centroid,
which would cancel the sensitivity reduction brought by microaggregation
in Step 1.
3.3. Choosing the microggregation parameter k
In order to obtain an ε-differentially private data set, by parallel com-
position it suffices to make each record ε-differentially private. In turn, to
make a record ε-differentially private, we have two possibilities:
1. Plain Laplace noise addition without microaggregation. Given that
each record hasm attributes, by sequential composition we need (ε/m)-
differentially private attribute values to obtain an ε-differentially pri-
vate record. Hence, Laplace noise addition with scale parameter ∆(Ai)/(ε/m) =
m∆(Ai)/ε needs to be added to each attribute Ai.
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2. Our approach. When performing individual-ranking microaggregation
and replacing original values by cluster centroids, we preserve the
structure of records. By sequential composition, to make a record
of XM ε-differentially private, we need to make attributes in XM
(ε/m)-differentially private. Hence, Laplace noise addition with scale
parameter ∆(AMi )/(ε/m) = m∆(A
M
i )/ε needs to be added to each
attribute AMi . However, dealing with A
M
i rather than Ai is better,
because AMi is less sensitive. Indeed, ∆(A
M
i ) = ∆(Ai)/k, so the scale
parameter is m∆(AMi )/(kε).
According to the above discussion, our approach adds less noise than
plain Laplace noise addition for any k > 1. Admittedly, its prior individual
ranking microaggregation causes some additional information loss. However,
this information loss grows very slowly with the cluster size k and also with
the number of attributes m (see [20]), whereas the Laplace noise being added
decreases very quickly with k. The experiments in Section 4 below show
that the information loss caused by individual ranking is negligible in front
of Laplace noise addition.
3.4. Dealing with categorical attributes
So far, we have assumed that attributes in the input data set are nu-
merical, so that: i) they are totally ordered; ii) centroids can be computed
as standard numerical averages; and iii) Laplace noise with an appropriate
scale parameter can be added to satisfy differential privacy. However, many
data sets contain attributes with categorical values, such as Ethnicity, Coun-
try of birth or Job. Unlike numerical attributes, categorical attributes take
values from a finite set of categories for which the arithmetical operations
needed to microaggregate and add noise to the outputs do not make sense.
Following the discussions in [17], some alternative mechanisms can be used
to adapt the above-described method to categorical attributes:
• Unlike numbers, the domain of values of a categorical attribute should
be defined by extension. Ways to do this are a flat list or a hierar-
chy/taxonomy. The latter is more desirable, since the taxonomy im-
plicitly captures the semantics inherent to categorical values (e.g., dis-
ease categories, job categories, sports categories, etc.). In this manner,
further operations can exploit this taxonomic knowledge and provide
a semantically coherent management of attribute values, which is usu-
ally the most important dimension of utility for categorical data [26].
• A suitable function is needed to compare categorical values that ex-
ploits the semantics provided by the corresponding taxonomies (if
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any). Semantic distance measures quantify the amount of differences
observed between two categorical values according to the knowledge
modeled in a taxonomy. In [17] several measures available in the liter-
ature were discussed from the perspective of differential privacy, and
the measure proposed in [44] was evaluated as the most suitable one. It
computes the distance δ : Ai×Ai → R between two categorical values
ai1 and a
i
2 of attribute Ai, whose domain is modeled in the taxonomy
τ(Ai), as a logarithmic function of their number of non-common tax-
onomic ancestors divided (for normalization) by their total number of
ancestors:
δ(ai1, a
i
2) = log2
(
1 +
|φ(ai1) ∪ φ(ai2)| − |φ(ai1) ∩ φ(ai2)|
|φ(ai1) ∪ φ(ai2)|
)
, (3)
where φ(aij) is the set of taxonomic ancestors of a
i
j in τ(Ai), including
itself.
The advantages of this measure are: i) it captures subtle differences
between values modeled in the taxonomy because all taxonomic an-
cestors are considered; ii) thanks to its non-linearity, its sensitivity to
outlying values is low, which is desirable to reduce the sensitivity of
data; iii) it fulfills the following measure properties: non-negativity, re-
flexivity, symmetry and triangle inequality, thereby defining a coherent
total order within the attribute categories.
• A total order that yields insensitive and within-cluster homogeneous
microaggregation can be defined through the notion of marginality [45].
Marginality measures how far each categorical value of the attribute in
the data set lies from the “center” of that attribute’s taxonomy, accord-
ing to a semantic distance (like the above-described one). A total order
between categorical values can be defined based on their marginality:
categorical values present in the data set are sorted according to their
distance to the most marginal value (i.e. the categorical value farthest
from the center of the domain). The marginality m(·, ·) of each value
aij in Ai with respect to its domain of values Dom(Ai) is computed as
m(Dom(Ai), a
i
j) =
∑
ail∈Dom(Ai)−{aij}
δ(ail, a
i
j) (4)
where δ(·, ·) is the semantic distance between two values. The greater
m(Dom(Ai), a
i
j), the more marginal (i.e., the less central) is a
i
j with
regard to Dom(Ai).
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• Microaggregation replaces original values in a cluster by the cluster
centroid, which is the arithmetical mean in case of numerical data.
Centroids for categorical data can be obtained by relying again on
marginality: the mean of a sample of categorical values can be ap-
proximated by the least marginal value in the taxonomy, that is, the
value that minimizes the aggregated distances to all other elements
in the data set [46]. Formally, given a sample S(Ai) of a nominal at-
tribute Ai in a certain cluster, the marginality-based centroid for that
cluster is defined as
Centroid(S(Ai)) = arg min
aij∈τ(S(Ai))
m(S(Ai), a
i
j), (5)
where τ(S(Ai)) is the minimum taxonomy extracted from τ(Ai) that
includes all values in S(Ai).
• Finally, to satisfy differential privacy, an amount of uncertainty pro-
portional to each attribute’s sensitivity should be added prior to re-
leasing the data. Since adding Laplace noise to categorical centroids
makes no sense, an alternative way to obtain differentially private out-
puts consists in selecting attribute centroids in a probabilistic manner.
This can be done by means of the Exponential Mechanism proposed
in [47]. This mechanism chooses the centroid closest to the optimum
(i.e. least marginal value, in our case) according to the input data,
the ε-differential privacy parameter and a quality criterion, which in
this case is the marginality of each categorical value. Formally, given
a function with discrete outputs t, the mechanism chooses an out-
put that is close to the optimum according to the input data X and
quality criterion q(X, t), while preserving ε-differential privacy. Each
output is associated with a selection probability Pr(t), which grows
exponentially with the quality criterion, as follows:
Pr(t) ∝ exp(εq(X, t)
2∆(q)
)
Algorithm 2 describes the application of this mechanism to select ε-
differentially private centroids.
Algorithm 2.
let C be a cluster with at least k values of the attribute Ai
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1. Take as the quality criterion q(·, ·) for each centroid candidate aij in
τ(Ai) the additive inverse of its marginality towards the attribute val-
ues S(Ai) contained in C, that is, −m(S(Ai), aij);
2. Sample the centroid from a distribution that assigns
Pr(aij) ∝ exp(
ε× (−m(S(Ai), aij))
2∆(m(Ai))
). (6)
4. Empirical evaluation
This section details the empirical evaluation of the proposed method (in
terms of noise reduction and utility preservation) in comparison with the
method in [17].
4.1. Evaluation data
As evaluation data we used two data sets:
• “Census” [48], which is a standard data set meant for testing privacy
protection methods. It was used in the European project CASC and
in [49, 50, 51, 10, 25] and it contains 1,080 records with 13 numeri-
cal attributes. Since all attributes represent non-negative numerical
magnitudes (i.e. money amounts), we defined the domains of the at-
tributes as [0 . . . (1.5×max attr. value in dataset)]. The domain up-
per bound is a reasonable estimate if the attribute values in the data
set are representative of the attribute values in the population, which
in particular means that the population outliers are represented in the
data set. The difference between the bounds of the domain of each
attribute Ai determines the sensitivity of that attribute (∆(Ai)) and,
as detailed above, determines the amount of Laplace noise to be added
to microaggregated outputs. Since the Laplace distribution takes val-
ues in the range (−∞,+∞), for consistency we bound noise-added
outputs to the domain ranges define above.
• “Adult” [52], which is a well-known data set from the UCI repository.
It contains both numeric and categorical attributes and it was also
used in [17]. To enable a fair comparison, we used the same attributes
as in [17]. As categorical attributes, we used OCCUPATION (that
covers 14 distinct categories) and NATIVE-COUNTRY (with 41 cat-
egories). The taxonomies modeling attribute domains were extracted
from WordNet 2.1 [53], a general-purpose repository that taxonomi-
cally models more than 100,000 concepts. Mappings between attribute
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labels and WordNet concepts are those stated in [26]. Domain bound-
aries for each attribute and sensitivities for centroid quality criteria
were set as described in Section 3.4. As numeric attributes, we used
AGE and (working) HOURS-PER-WEEK. Domain boundaries and
sensitivities for these two numerical attributes were computed as ex-
plained for “Census”. The experiments were carried out with the train-
ing corpus from the Adult data set, which consists of 30,162 records
after removing records with missing values of the considered attributes.
4.2. Evaluation measures and experiments
Since our proposal aims at providing differentially private outputs while
making as few assumptions on their uses as k-anonymity-like models do, we
used generic utility metrics, as usual in the literature on k-anonymity and
statistical disclosure control (e.g. [10]). In that literature, the utility of the
anonymized output is evaluated in terms of information loss. Information
loss measures the differences between the original and the anonymized data
set.
A well-known generic information loss measure that is suitable to capture
the distortion of the output is the Relative Error (RE), which measures
the error of an answer as a function of the answer’s magnitude; in this
manner, answers with large magnitudes can tolerate larger errors [54]. In
our setting, for each numerical attribute value aij , RE is measured as the
absolute difference between each original attribute value aij and its masked
version (aij)
′ divided by the original value.
Relative Error(aij) =
|aij − (aij)′|
max(sanity bound(Ai), |aij |)
A sanity bound is included in the denominator to mitigate the effect of
excessively small values. Since in our approach we aim at publishing the
attribute values of the records in the data set, we defined this sanity bound
as a function of the domain of values Dom(Ai) each attribute Ai; specifically,
sanitybound(Ai) = Dom(Ai)/100. In this manner, the mitigation effect of
the sanity bound is adapted to the order of magnitude of each attribute.
For categorical attributes we directly measured the error as the semantic
distance (Expression ( 3)) between original and masked records, which is
already normalized in the 0..1 range. The Relative Error of the whole data
set X is measured as the average Relative Error of all attributes of all
records. Notice that with a high error, that is, a high information loss, a
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lot of data uses are severely damaged, like for example subdomain analyses
(analyses restricted to parts of the data set).
Another generic information loss measure focuses on how different are
variances of attributes in the original and anonymized data sets [55]. Pre-
serving the sample variance is relevant for statistical analysis and closely
depends on how constrained the microggregation algorithm is. The varia-
tion of the attribute variances (for numerical attributes) has been measured
as follows:
∆(σ2(Ai)) =
| σ2(A′i)− σ2(Ai) |
| σ2(Ai) | ,
where σ2(Ai) and σ
2(A′i) denote the variances of attribute Ai in the original
data set and its masked version, respectively.
Moreover, since many works on differential privacy focus on preserving
the utility of counting queries [35, 31, 32, 27, 28, 29, 30], we measured how
the methods preserve the data distribution by building histograms of each
attribute and comparing the distribution between the original and masked
values according to the well-known Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) [56],
which is symmetric and bounded in the 0..1 range. At a data set level,
we averaged the divergence of all the attributes. Histograms for continu-
ous attributes (i.e., those of the “Census” data set) have been created by
grouping records in bins accounting 1/100th of the attribute domain. In the
“Adult” data set, in which all the attributes (either numeric or categorical)
are discrete and have a limited set of values, each bin corresponds to one
individual attribute value.
The ε parameter for differential privacy was set to ε = {0.1, 1, 10}, which
covers the usual range of differential privacy levels observed in the litera-
ture [57, 58, 59, 33, 17]. As discussed in Section 3.2, the scale parameter of
the Laplace noise needed by our method to achieve ε-differential privacy is
∆(Ai)/(k× (ε/m)); that is, it depends on the level k of prior microaggrega-
tion and on the number m of attributes to be protected. We evaluated the
influence of these parameters in the “Census” data set by taking k between
2 and 100 and m ∈ {1, 8, 13}. For the “Adult” data set, as done in [17], we
set k between 2 and 200.
4.3. Comparison with baseline methods
In order to benchmark the results of our proposal, we considered the
following baseline methods:
• Plain Laplace noise addition for ε-differential privacy as described in
Section 3.3 above. Even though this mechanism is the naivest way to
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produce differentially private data sets, it is useful as an upper bound
of information loss. By comparing against it, we can quantify the gain
brought by the prior microaggregation steps.
• Plain individual ranking, with no subsequent Laplace noise addition.
Although this method does not lead to ε-differential privacy by it-
self, we want to show the contribution of individual ranking to the
information loss caused by our method.
We computed RE and JSD for the baseline methods above and our ap-
proach for the two evaluation data sets. Figure 1 shows the comparison
between plain Laplace noise addition, plain individual ranking and our ap-
proach for “Census”; Figure 2 shows the same comparison for “Adult”. Due
to the broad ranges of the RE values, a log10 scale is used for the Y-axes.
The plain Laplace noise addition baselines are displayed as gray horizon-
tal lines, because they do not depend on the value of k. Each test involving
Laplace noise shows the average results of 10 runs, for the sake of stability. In
any case, the spikes shown in the graphs are the result of the randomization
inherent to Laplace noise addition.
Both Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that, already for k > 1, our approach
reduces the noise required to attain ε-differential privacy compared to plain
Laplace noise addition. This confirms what was said in Section 3.3.
The relative improvement of RE depends on the value of ε. For ε = 0.1
the amount of noise involved is so high that even with the noise reduction
achieved by our method, the output data are hardly useful. For ε = 10 there
is a substantial decline of RE for low k, whereas for larger k RE stays nearly
constant and is almost as low as the RE achieved by individual ranking
alone. This is especially noticeable when only one attribute is protected
(for the “Census” data set) for which the information loss of the proposed
method even grows for k > 25; with a single attribute, we do not need to
apply sequential composition (that would require more noise to be added)
in order to attain a certain level of ε-differential privacy; at the same time,
while for large ε the RE of the method can be as low as the RE of individual
ranking, it cannot be lower, which explains why the former RE grows for
large k in the top-left graph of Figure 1 (in that graph the RE of the method
becomes equal to the RE of individual ranking and the latter RE grows with
k). Thus, for large ε, the distortion added by individual ranking in larger
clusters limits the effect of the noise reduction achieved at the ε-differential
privacy stage due to the decreased sensitivity with larger k. For the “Adult”
data set, the difference in RE between the ε-differentially private outcome
and the plain individual ranking is more noticeable because of the need to
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Figure 1: “Census” data set: RE (on the left) and JSD (on the right) for the proposed
method for several numbers of attributes (m) and ε values (black non-horizontal lines, as
RE and JSD depend on the microaggregation parameter k) compared to plain Laplace
noise addition (gray horizontal lines, because RE and JSD do not depend on k) and plain
individual ranking microaggregation.
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Figure 2: “Adult” data set: RE (on the left) and JSD (on the right) for the proposed
method for several ε values (black non-horizontal lines, as RE and JSD depend on the
microaggregation parameter k) compared to plain Laplace noise addition (gray horizontal
lines, because RE and JSD do not depend on k) and plain individual ranking microaggre-
gation.
discretize noise-added values. However, the larger cardinality of the data set
also allows using larger k values (to reduce the sensitivity) than in “Census”
with comparable utility damage.
The comparison of distributions between the original and the masked
data also outputs a similar pattern: JSD improves for k > 1. For the
“Adult” data set, Figure 2 shows that the behaviors of JSD and RE are
similar. For the “Census” data set, however, Figure 1 reports a sharp decline
of JSD for low k, whereas for large k the divergence of distributions tends to
increase; this is especially noticeable for ε = 10, whose results for k > 10 (for
a single attribute) and for k > 45 (for multiple attributes) are even worse
than with with plain Laplace noise. In these cases, the distortion introduced
by the individual ranking microaggregation dominates the gain brought by
the reduced noise addition. This is clearer when the number of attributes is
small, because so is the noise to be added to fulfill ε-differential privacy. It is
important to note that, for the “Census” data set, the continuous values of
the attributes have been discretized in bins covering 1/100th of the attribute
domain. Thus, a microaggregation with a low k would tend to cluster values
that fall within the same bin, which explains the low distortion incurred
in the (discretized) distributions. For larger k, however, microaggregation
tends to group records of different bins, which significantly alters the data
distribution; this is precisely what happens for the “Adult” data set for any
value of k, because bins cover individual attribute values.
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4.4. Comparison with prior multivariate microaggregation
In a second battery of experiments, we compared the proposed method
with the previous work [17], in which records were microaggregated using
an insensitive version of the MDAV multivariate algorithm [10].
Similarly to previous figures, Figures 3 and 4 depict the RE and JSD
values for the different parameterizations of k, ε and m, for the “Census”
and “Adult” data sets, respectively. The results of the proposed method are
represented with black lines whereas the results of the previous work [17] are
displayed by gray lines with the same pattern for each ε value. As baselines,
we also added the RE and JSD values incurred by the individual ranking
and the insensitive MDAV microaggregation algorithms alone.
First, we notice that insensitive MDAV multivariate microaggregation
alone incurs a noticeably higher RE than plain individual ranking microag-
gregation for m > 1. JSD is also higher for “Census” and significantly higher
for “Adult”, because in the latter case the already discrete values are not
grouped into bins and, thus, any change is reflected as a divergence in distri-
butions. In fact, for “Adult” our differentially private method is even able to
improve the figures of insensitive MDAV for k > 100. For m = 1, both types
of microaggregation are equivalent, so their REs and JSDs overlap. On the
other hand, as discussed in Section 3.3, for multivariate data sets (m > 1),
individual ranking microaggregation yields more homogeneous clusters than
MDAV multivariate microaggregation, because the former method builds
clusters on an attribute-by-attribute basis, whereas the latter builds clus-
ters by taking all attributes together. Moreover, the insensitive version of
MDAV required for the method in [17] to fulfill differential privacy produces
yet less homogeneous clusters, due to the artificial total order enforced for
input records.
When comparing both differentially private approaches, our current pro-
posal offers a significant improvement in most cases (for RE and JSD), but
such an improvement depends on the number of attributes to be protected.
For m = 1, we observe the largest differences between both methods, be-
cause the scale parameter of our approach is just ∆(A)/(k× ε) whereas it is
n/k× (∆(A)/(k×ε) for [17]. In fact, even for the smallest ε value (ε = 0.1),
the reduction of information loss is noticeable. However, as shown also in the
previous experiments, for the largest ε value (ε = 10), the distortion caused
by individual ranking dominates the small amount noise subsequently added
to satisfy differential privacy, which is especially noticeable for the JSD; for
k > 20 (for RE) or k > 10 (for JSD) this effect overrides the improvement
brought by our proposed method.
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Figure 3: “Census” data set: RE (on the left) and JSD (on the right) in the proposed
method for several numbers of attributes (m) and ε values (black dashed lines) compared
to the previous work [17] (gray dashed lines), the insensitive version of the MDAV mi-
croaggregation algorithm (gray solid lines) and the plain individual ranking method (black
solid lines).
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Figure 4: “Adult” data set: RE (on the left) and JSD (on the right) in the proposed
method for several ε values (black dashed lines) compared to the previous work [17] (gray
dashed lines), the insensitive version of the MDAV microaggregation algorithm (gray solid
lines) and the plain individual ranking method (black solid lines).
When the number m of attributes to be protected increases, the effec-
tive reduction of RE and JSD achieved by our approach decreases, because
the scale of the required noise increases as ∆(A)/(k × (ε/m)), whereas it
stays constant for the method in [17]. Indeed, using prior individual-ranking
microaggregation requires subsequently adding noise whose scale factor in-
creases with m in order to attain ε-differential privacy, whereas the noise
to be added after multivariate microaggregation does not depend on m (see
Section 3.2 above). When m grows, this subsequent noise addition may
override the advantage of individual ranking with respect to multivariate
microaggregation; in practice, this only happens in pretty extreme cases
(with many attributes, small ε values and large k values), because multi-
variate microaggregation also incurs substantial information loss for large
m. In Figure 3 we can see some such extreme cases (m = 13, ε = 10 and
k > 80 values) in which the method in [17] is able to match or slightly out-
perform our method; this is more noticeable for JSD than for RE because,
in the former case, the discretization of the continuous attribute values into
bins smooths the effects of the noise. It is however interesting to observe
that, for ε = 10, our method is even able to outperform the multivariate
microaggregation for k > 20 (with 8 attributes) and for k > 30 (with 13
attributes). This shows the greater room for improvement that individual
ranking offers over the multivariate microaggregation for m > 1.
In fact, by equating the noise scale parameter of [17] and our method,
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we have
n/k × (∆(Ai)/(k × ε) = m× (∆(Ai)/(k × ε).
Hence, both scale parameters coincide for n/k = m. Thus, for k > n/m, the
scale parameter of [17] and therefore the noise added to reach ε-differential
privacy are smaller. For the “Census” data set, this means k > (1, 080/13) ≈
83. When the number of attributes to be protected decreases to m = 8, we
get k > (1, 080/8) = 135 (which is beyond the k values represented in the
X-axes of the above figures); further, for m = 1, we get k > (1, 080/1) = n,
which is outright impossible. Moreover, the practical reduction of informa-
tion loss is only noticeable for small ε values (0.1 and 1.0). For ε = 10.0,
the high information loss caused by the insensitive MDAV algorithm alone
severely limits the noise reduction gain.
Finally, to evaluate the influence of the prior microaggregation algo-
rithm, we measured the preservation of attribute variances as described in
Section 4.2. This was done for “Census”, which is the only data set with
continuous numeric attributes. The results with 8 attributes are reported in
Table 1. In particular, the table shows that, for medium and large ε (values
1 and 10), our method based on individual ranking significantly improves
on the MDAV-based one in [17] for all k.
We can see that the variations of the attribute variances are always
greater (for all attributes and all k and ε values) for the method in [17] than
for the one proposed in this paper. Differences between the two methods
are greater for larger ε values (i.e., 1 and 10) and larger k values (i.e. 25
and above); in these cases, the amount of noise that needs to be added is
smaller and, thus, the influence of the prior microaggregation is more no-
ticeable. The differences between both methods illustrate how individual-
ranking microaggregation does a better job at preserving the internal struc-
ture (and, thus the statistical properties) of the attributes, since these are ag-
gregated independently. In contrast, multivariate microaggregation is more
constrained because all the attributes of each record are considered at once;
this suppresses more variance and hence incurs higher information loss. In
any case, the variations of the attribute variances tend to decrease as k
grows, which suggests that the prior microaggregation helps decrease the
large variance introduced by the noise added to satisfy differential privacy.
However, there are some cases (i.e. attributes 2, 4, 5 and 8) in which, for
large ε and k values (i.e. 10 and 100, respectively), variations increase; this
shows how, for relaxed values of ε, the distortion introduced by the coarser
microaggregation dominates the reduction of noise.
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Table 1: “Census”: variations of attribute variances between the attributes in the original
and masked data sets with the proposed method (IR, individual ranking) and the one
in [17] (MV, MDAV multivariate microaggregation) using different values of k and ε.
ε = 0.1 ε = 1 ε = 10
k IR MV IR MV IR MV
∆(σ2(A1)) 2 25.89 25.06 22.84 25.01 9.42 24.77
25 21.74 24.57 8.08 20.19 0.16 3.06
50 20.75 23.05 2.33 9.80 0.02 0.45
100 15.27 17.38 0.38 0.95 0.02 0.89
∆(σ2(A2)) 2 9.14 8.21 7.40 8.20 3.45 8.12
25 8.33 8.05 2.30 6.62 0.12 1.23
50 7.41 7.52 1.13 3.63 0.04 0.12
100 5.69 5.84 0.11 0.50 0.05 0.18
∆(σ2(A3)) 2 24.97 24.90 11.79 22.89 0.47 10.36
25 24.83 24.80 12.85 22.72 0.44 8.63
50 24.17 24.83 9.64 22.56 0.37 8.10
100 23.63 24.78 9.60 22.27 0.1 6.84
∆(σ2(A4)) 2 10.46 9.58 8.69 9.55 3.72 9.46
25 9.43 9.35 2.39 7.64 0.08 1.13
50 8.29 8.78 1.16 3.81 0.00 0.06
100 5.78 6.65 0.48 0.42 0.03 0.23
∆(σ2(A5)) 2 16.71 15.87 14.50 15.84 6.59 15.62
25 14.35 15.54 5.33 12.87 0.16 2.22
50 13.13 14.60 2.41 6.63 0.01 0.06
100 9.86 11.48 0.18 0.94 0.05 0.27
∆(σ2(A6)) 2 22.07 21.22 19.30 21.21 8.20 21.04
25 19.50 20.73 6.36 17.12 0.19 2.37
50 15.61 19.44 3.63 8.05 0.03 0.15
100 10.20 14.81 0.45 0.85 0.04 0.44
∆(σ(2A7)) 2 8.61 7.69 6.91 7.69 3.12 7.57
25 7.63 7.54 2.97 6.14 0.03 1.12
50 6.57 7.05 0.95 3.25 0.02 0.06
100 4.95 5.44 0.30 0.41 0.01 0.20
∆(σ2(A8)) 2 70.22 69.71 64.01 69.66 24.06 68.89
25 63.42 68.21 14.90 55.85 0.05 5.93
50 49.28 64.05 3.66 25.56 0.12 0.25
100 41.36 47.38 0.78 2.05 0.21 0.81
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5. Conclusions
In [17] a method was presented that combines k-anonymity and ε-differential
privacy to reap the best of both models: namely, on the one side the rea-
sonably low information loss incurred by k-anonymity and its lack of as-
sumptions on data uses (which do not limit the kind of analyses that can be
performed), and on the other side the robust privacy guarantees offered by
ε-differential privacy. In this paper, we have offered an alternative method
that, by relying individual ranking microaggregation, is able to effectively
reduce even more the scale parameter of noise in most scenarios, which is
of utmost importance for data analysis. Such noise reduction has been dis-
cussed theoretically and it has been illustrated empirically for two reference
data sets, by focusing on the error introduced in the attribute values and
the preservation of attribute distributions.
The method proposed here is also easier to implement than the one
in [17], because the individual ranking algorithm only relies on the natural
order of individual attributes. Moreover, its computational cost is O(n×m),
whereas insensitive multivariate microaggregation takes O(n × n). Since
usually n m, the current method is more scalable as the number of records
in a data set grows. Moreover, prior individual-ranking microaggregation
incurs less information loss than the prior multivariate microaggregation
used in [17]. Finally, the proposed method is especially indicated when only
a subset of attributes needs to be protected (e.g. the confidential attributes).
We leave as future work the exploration of other types of noise. For
instance, using a noise calibrated to the smooth sensitivity of the data would
seem an interesting improvement. The main reason is that it would reduce
the dependency of the amount of required noise on the size of the attribute
domain.
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